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Holding the Door Half (?) Open: the EU and Turkey ten years on 
 
Prof. David Phinnemore, Queen's University Belfast 
Dr. Erhan İçener, Bursa Orhangazi University  
 
 
A decade of accession negotiations with the EU has not brought Turkey significantly 
closer to EU membership. In part the reasons lie with Turkey. This article, however, 
explores the position of the EU and the ‘supply-side’ of enlargement. It reflects on 
developments in how the EU has engaged with Turkey on the question of 
membership, situating Turkey’s candidacy and the EU’s position within the broader 
comparative context of how the process and politics of EU enlargement have 
evolved over the last ten years. It focuses on a set of supply-side variables that are 
key to determining the progress that applicants can make towards membership: 
member state preferences, the activism of supranational institutional actors, the 
EU’s integration capacity, public opinion in the EU towards enlargement, and the 
narratives deployed in justification of enlargement. The article also considers the 
state of Turkey’s accession negotiations and how they have been and potentially will 
be affected, assuming they are meaningfully revived, by the evolving nature and 
substance of EU accession negotiations more generally and EU’s approach to 
conditionality.  
 
As with almost any ten year period in the history of EU-Turkey relations, the decade since accession 
negotiations were launched in October 2005 has witnessed moments of relative warmth in relations 
as well as, more often, periods of evident coolness. The effect is clear from the state of the 
negotiations, which have lasted far longer than any other set. As of early 2016, only 15 of the 35 
negotiating chapters have been opened and only one has been provisionally closed. Any optimism 
and dynamic in the negotiations has all but gone. The language surrounding negotiations has 
generally been one of ‘stalemate’ and ‘impasse’. Moreover, Croatia, which saw its accession 
negotiations open alongside those with Turkey, has already joined the EU in 2013 and Montenegro, 
with which the EU opened accession negotiations in June 2012, has opened 22 negotiating chapters 
and closed two. And then there is Iceland which, during the ten years that Turkey has been 
negotiating accession, has applied for membership, opened 27 out of 35 negotiating chapters, and 
provisionally closed 11 of them, only subsequently in effect to abandon its membership bid. By 
contrast, and despite various attempts to keep the accession process dynamic, progress in Turkey’s 
accession negotiations with the EU has become glacial, in fact almost non-existent. A glimmer of 
hope for progress did emerge in the winter of 2015-16 as the EU committed to making progress in 
the accession negotiations in exchange for Turkish support in managing flows of refugees and 
migrants to Europe especially those fleeing the war in Syria. The fact remains, however, that Turkey 
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is little closer to acceding to the EU than it was in 2005. Who is to blame for this state of affairs is an 
open question, as is whether there is any real prospect of substantial progress in the negotiations 
and Turkey ultimately joining the EU. Such questions are the regular focus of discussion and debate 
in Turkey and the EU, with various calls being issued to abandon the negotiations, or at least their 
formal focus on accession. However, the fact is that negotiations are ongoing; accession is still being 
negotiated. And even if the negotiations are proceeding at a snail’s pace, the EU, particularly since 
the first ever ‘EU-Turkey summit’ in November 2015, is committed to the opening of further 
negotiating chapters. The door to accession has not been closed; it remains open … at least formally.  
 
All the same, the hesitant optimism that surrounded the opening of accession negotiations in 2005 
has all but evaporated. Moreover, the decade since has witnessed considerable political, economic 
and social change within the EU and Turkey. This is borne out in other contributions to this special 
issue. Whereas they generally focus on developments in Turkey and how these have affected and 
continue to impact on the country’s membership prospects, this article has a firmer focus on the EU 
and the ‘supply-side’ of enlargement. It therefore not only reflects on developments in how the EU 
has engaged with Turkey on the question of membership, it also situates Turkey’s candidacy and the 
EU’s position within the broader context of how the process and politics of EU enlargement have 
evolved over the last ten years and how changes have impacted on Turkey’s membership prospects. 
To do so, the article considers a set of supply-side variables that are key to determining the progress 
that applicants can make towards membership (İçener, Phinnemore, and Papadimitriou 2010): the 
EU’s integration capacity, member state preferences, public opinion in the EU towards enlargement, 
the activism of supranational institutional actors, and the narratives deployed in justification of 
enlargement. The analysis therefore reflects on not only the bilateral EU-Turkey dimension to 
enlargement, but also the wider context and so places the Turkish experiences of seeking and 
negotiating accession in comparative perspective.1 Before exploring the five variables, the article 
considers the state of Turkey’s accession negotiations and how they have been and potentially will 
be affected, assuming they are meaningfully revived, by the evolving nature and substance of EU 
accession negotiations more generally and EU’s approach to conditionality. 
 
Turkey’s EU accession negotiations  
 
When the EU and Turkey opened accession negotiations in October 2005, pragmatic voices 
suggested they would last ten or possibly even 15 years (BBC News 2005; The Guardian 2005). 
                                                          
1
 For earlier comparative work, see Verney (2007). 
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Supporters of Turkish accession argued in favour of earlier admission, possibly in 2012 (Redmond 
2007). All optimism for timely progress soon evaporated. Although in June 2006, a first chapter – 
Chapter 25 on science and research – was opened and immediately ‘provisionally closed’ (see Figure 
1), six months later EU member states agreed that eight chapters could not be opened until the 
Commission can verify that Turkey has fulfilled its obligation of ‘full non-discriminatory 
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement’ (Council of the European 
Union 2006, 8-9), i.e. opened its ports and airports to traffic and trade from Cyprus (see Figure 2). 
The reference to ‘full non-discriminatory’ implementation was a tightening of requirements and a 
very public rebuke for Turkey. Although, the decision did not prevent five chapters being opened in 
2007, it did act as a timely reminder of the conditionality on which progress would be based, the 
expectation that conditions would be met, and the heavily politicised nature of the negotiations. 
Moreover, certain member states were keen to use all available opportunities to hinder if not block 
progress. This became abundantly clear in 2007 when France, now with the Turkosceptic Nicolas 
Sarkozy as President, declared that it was not prepared to see the five chapters most directly related 
to membership – only one of which was covered by the Council’s 2006 decision – being opened (see 
Figure 3). France was effectively casting a veto over the opening of negotiations in core policy areas, 
financial matters and the institutions.  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE OR HEREABOUTS] 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE OR HEREABOUTS] 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE OR HEREABOUTS] 
 
Over the next two years seven further chapters were nevertheless opened. However, the prospects 
for the negotiations suffered a further setback in June 2009 when Cyprus announced that it was 
unilaterally blocking the opening of a further six chapters (see Figure 3). A year later another chapter 
– Chapter 12 on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy – was opened, yet the blocking 
tactics of Cyprus and France have since meant that it has been possible for only two further chapters 
to be opened. In November 2013 France partially lifted its 2007 veto and Chapter 22 – regional 
policy and coordination of structural instruments was opened. A further partial lifting of the French 
veto followed in December 2015 with the opening of Chapter 17 on economic and monetary policy. 
Throughout this period, however, there has been barely any progress in closing chapters. Only one 
has been provisionally closed.  
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Neither Turkey nor the EU has, however, abandoned the negotiations. The most recent Turkish 
policy statement on EU accession – Turkey’s European Union Strategy – has a clear focus on 
promoting ‘EU harmonisation efforts’ and ‘accelerat[-ing] the work in all chapters, whether 
politically blocked or not’ (Republic of Turkey – Ministry for EU Affairs 2014, 4). On the EU side, the 
Commission and leading voices in the European Parliament (EP), including successive rapporteurs on 
Turkey, have continued to push for more chapters to be opened and for the negotiations to be 
progressed. More specifically the Commission in May 2012 launched a ‘Positive Agenda’ aimed at 
reviving the accession process. This involves working groups assisting Turkey in aligning domestic 
policies and legislation with key areas of the acquis communautaire.2 Reaction to the Positive 
Agenda has though been mixed, with critics regarding it as a thinly disguised alternative to 
negotiations and a precursor to the latter’s abandonment. The Commission view is that this latest 
form of ‘enhanced cooperation’ ‘support[s] and complement[s]’ the accession negotiations 
(European Commission 2013, 40). It at least allows formal discussions to be held on as yet unopened 
chapters.  
 
Indeed, the Commission has long been signalling that a range of opening and closing benchmarks for 
some chapters have been met and, assuming the political will can be found, relevant chapters could 
be opened or closed (Interview, Brussels, 3 July 2014). A sense of political will did emerge in the 
autumn of 2015 when, in response to the need to secure Turkish support for stemming migration 
flows to the EU, in particular refugees from Syria, and for supporting the fight against international 
terrorism, the European Council recognized the necessity to ‘re-energize’ Turkey’s accession process 
(Council of the European Union 2015a, point 2a). The opening of Chapter 17 on economic and 
monetary policy followed a month later. In addition, the Commission expedited preparations for the 
opening of negotiations on a further five chapters: 15 on energy, 23 on judiciary and fundamental 
rights, 24 on justice, freedom and security, 26 on education and culture, and 31 on foreign, security 
and defence policy. Statements issued at a first ever EU-Turkey summit in November 2015 noted this 
preparatory work and signalled a readiness to open a number of chapters in the first quarter of 2016 
(Council of the European Union 2015b, point 4). Initial indications were that it would be these five 
chapters. In March 2016, the European Council signalled that Chapter 33 on Financial and budgetary 
provisions would be opened before the end of June (European Council, 2016). 
 
                                                          
2
 The areas covered include: visas, mobility and migration, energy, trade and the customs union, political 
reforms, fight against terrorism, foreign policy dialogue and participation in EU programmes. 
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Despite the tentative rejuvenation of the negotiating process in 2015-16, any analysis of EU-Turkey 
relations cannot escape the fact that the negotiations have in the last decade been as much 
characterised by stalemate as progress. Moreover, the rate of progress has, as noted, been 
considerably behind that of other applicant states. It follows that the reasons explaining the 
slowdown have as much to do with the specifics of Turkey’s candidacy as with the EU’s approach 
generally to enlargement since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. However, the latter cannot be 
ignored. Indeed, shifts in the dynamics underpinning Turkey’s accession process cannot be divorced 
from the EU’s handling of enlargement more widely. One obvious impact is the EU’s emphasis since 
2006 on Chapters 23 and 24, so evident in the frameworks for negotiations with Montenegro and 
Serbia. The focus is on opening these chapters early and making progress generally in negotiations 
conditional on progress in them. In Turkey’s case, the Commission in 2013 was forthright: progress 
in accession negotiations and progress in Chapter 23 and 24 reforms as ‘two sides of the same coin’ 
(European Commission 2013, point 17). The early focus of the Positive Agenda has also been very 
much on these chapters with the Commission also pushing the Turkish government to focus on rule 
of law issues and anti-corruption.3 The EU’s approach generally to accession negotiations casts it 
shadow over Turkey’s negotiations. 
 
Enlargement conditionality  
 
The focus that the EU currently places on prioritizing Chapters 23 and 24 is a clear reminder of the 
central formal role that conditionality plays in determining the progress of candidates towards 
membership. As we have argued elsewhere in the context of the Western Balkans (İçener and 
Phinnemore 2014), conditionality is being applied more strictly than in previous enlargement 
rounds. This is in part due to the ‘renewed consensus’ on enlargement that the European Council 
                                                          
3
 Concerns about corruption have since increased, particularly in the light of the December 2013 allegations 
against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister of Turkey, now President, various ministers, their relatives 
as well as various public officials and businesspeople, and the manner in which the allegations were 
investigated and the significant number of reassignments and dismissals in the police, judiciary and civil 
service. The Commission in 2014 was pointed in its comment that: ‘[t]he handling of these allegations of 
corruption raised serious concerns that allegations of wrongdoing would not be addressed in a non-
discriminatory, transparent and impartial manner’ (European Commission 2014, 14). In 2015, it noted no 
progress in Chapter 23 instead flagging problems regarding the state of Turkey’s judicial system, the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the separation of powers, the investigation and prosecution of 
high-level corruption cases and the political pressure being placed on judges, prosecutors, the media and free 
speech (European Commission 2015a, 55). 
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agreed in 2006 which stresses ‘strict conditionality’ as the basis on which accession negotiations will 
be pursued (Council of the European Union 2007, point 7). In addition, however, not only are 
applicant states expected to meet a wider range of conditions, but the compliance thresholds have 
been raised and the points at which criteria need to be met have in many instances been brought 
forward. The effect has been to lengthen the accession process. It also creates more gate-keeping 
opportunities for the EU and its member states to exploit, hence a ‘creeping nationalisation’ of 
enlargement policy (Hillion 2010). Moreover, developments elsewhere in the application of 
enlargement conditionality can be expected to be applied, not least to ensure consistency in how 
the EU approaches negotiations. In procedural terms this could mean Turkey, like Montenegro and 
Serbia, having to meet interim benchmarks in Chapters 23 and 24. In practical terms, the demands 
associated with compliance are likely, following the practice with Montenegro and Serbia, to be 
higher, certainly more technical and based on increased EU monitoring. As one official has 
remarked, the dynamic within the enlargement process, especially the emphasis on implementation 
of the acquis and solid track records of compliance ‘will for sure be felt’ by Turkey (Interview, 
Brussels, 2 July 2014).  
 
At first glance, the EU’s decision in 2015 to rejuvenate the accession negotiations suggests otherwise 
given the concerns that have been expressed regarding respect in Turkey for the rule of law, 
fundamental rights, strengthening democratic institutions, economic governance and public 
administration reform. However, with conditionality having become largely ineffective in the 
absence of a credible membership perspective, granting progress in negotiations in exchange for 
assistance with refugees and migrants was but a temporary Realpolitik-driven side-lining of EU 
norms and values designed to ‘re-energize’ the accession negotiations and so an opportunity to re-
establish EU leverage. Conditionality was not being abandoned. Indeed, the European Council 
President, Donald Tusk, was quick to stress: ‘we are not re-writing the EU enlargement policy. The 
negotiating framework and the relevant conclusions continue to apply, including its merit-based 
nature and the respect for European values, also on human rights’ (Council of the European Union 
2015c). The Commission’s delayed 2015 Regular Report on Turkey and the accompanying 
Enlargement Strategy paper were equally clear in stressing the need for a strict application of 
conditionality and insisting that Turkey needed to meet conditions and fulfil existing obligations if 
progress in negotiations were to be achieved. 
 
The EU’s integration capacity 
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Throughout the history of Turkey’s efforts to secure EU membership, the impact that Turkey would 
have on the EU has always featured prominently in the arguments of those opposed to its 
admission. A key argument has been that the EU simply does not have the capacity to integrate a 
country of Turkey’s size. Successive enlargements, and in particular the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 
2004, clearly demonstrate, however, that the EU does have the capacity to enlarge and to integrate 
new members. The argument that Turkey poses too many insuperable problems for it to be 
admitted is therefore significantly weakened. The arguments surrounding integration capacity have 
not, however, gone away. Indeed, the experience of eastern enlargement has undoubtedly 
strengthened the position of those who argue that the EU simply could not handle the migration 
flows that the extension of the free movement of people to Turkey could entail. And their position 
has been strengthened by not only the 2015 migration crisis, but also the increasing Islamophobia 
within the EU. Turkey’s formal, self-declared status as a secular state carries little weight, in part 
because of the predominantly Muslim identity of a majority of its citizens, in part because of the 
perceived de-secularization and presumed re-Islamization policies of recent AKP governments and 
the current Erdoğan presidency. Financially, despite its economic growth over the last decade, 
Turkey’s admission would still place major strains on the EU budget and its redistributive policies. As 
for the EU’s institutional capacity, long-known challenges remain, especially where the distribution 
of EP seats and the size of Turkey’s vote in the Council are concerned. Although these could be 
overcome, prejudiced arguments about Turkey potentially being the EU’s largest and therefore most 
powerful member state in terms of voting power continue to resonate.  
 
Integration capacity arguments tend to impact on discussions about Turkish accession less than they 
have in the past because currently the political will to admit Turkey barely exists. Indeed, it is here 
that the capacity of the EU to integrate is essentially lacking; member state preferences simply 
diverge too much even for agreement to be reached on progressing accession negotiations, let alone 
admitting Turkey. The same can be said for public opinion (see below). Moreover, a sense of 
‘enlargement fatigue’ has come to pervade the EU over the last decade. Enlargement simply does 
not command the enthusiasm it seemingly did during the early 2000s. Important here for Turkey is 
the persistent prominence given to ‘integration capacity’ within current EU discourse on 
enlargement. A long-standing feature of enlargement debates, integration capacity during the 
process of eastern enlargement attracted comparatively limited attention. The situation has since 
changed, much to the disadvantage of current applicants. Having been an ‘oft-forgotten’ criteria 
(İçener and Phinnemore 2006), it is rarely far from the centre of considerations on whether and with 
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what speed to proceed with enlargement. And for the EU, Turkey has long posed and continues to 
pose the most challenges. 
 
Member state preferences  
 
Turkey’s misfortune in the EU enlargement process is that it not only poses challenges for the EU 
generally, but these and other challenges have long attracted particular attention at the level of the 
member states. Moreover, the member states show little reluctance to voice and act on their 
concerns. Indeed, Turkey’s experience of accession negotiations so far is the example par excellence 
of how important member state preferences can be for determining the dynamics of enlargement. 
Certain Member states have not shied away from either criticising Turkey’s engagement with the 
accession process or indeed blocking its progress. The path towards membership has long been 
strewn with member state vetoes. In the 1980s and 1990s, Greece habitually blocked EU funding for 
and the development of relations with Turkey. In 1999, it switched to become an advocate of 
Turkish accession.4 Austria took over the mantle of chief sceptic, only lifting its veto over the opening 
negotiations in 2005 in exchange for a deal on negotiations being opened with Croatia. Since then, 
not only have individual member states, notably Cyprus and France, been casting vetoes but the 
member states collectively have, as already noted, formally agreed not to open eight chapters (see 
Figure 2). Such regular and very public displays of formal member state power in accession 
negotiations are unprecedented. 
 
This has not led to the collapse of Turkey’s accession process. Indeed, a number of member states 
regularly reaffirm their commitment to seeing applicants and candidates, Turkey included, joining, 
albeit often in rather vague terms. None has over the last decade recalled, however, the language of 
the 1999 Helsinki European Council that Turkey ‘is a candidate State destined to join the Union’ 
(Council of the European Union 1999, point 12). For some, the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
needs though to be upheld; the EU is obliged to deliver on its commitment to support Turkey’s goal 
of gaining membership. And Turkey does have supporters. The most generous support often comes 
from the United Kingdom. In 2010, the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, vowed ‘to make the case 
for Turkey’s membership … and to fight for it’ (UK Government 2010). Four years later on a second 
                                                          
4
 See Agnantopoulos (2013). 
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visit to Ankara, Cameron restated his basic position, albeit with less enthusiastic language.5 Such 
support is valuable, and UK government arguments highlighting Turkey’s economic significance and 
its contribution to European security and defence interests as well as transnational energy networks 
do resonate with other member states. However, the increasing self-marginalization of the United 
Kingdom within the EU means that the UK government exerts little influence on major questions 
facing the EU such as Turkish membership. There are other voices though supporting, if not 
necessarily advancing, the Turkish case. The Swedish, Finnish and Italian governments generally 
share the UK government’s view (Hague and Stubb 2010; Bildt et al., 2010) and emphasise the 
strategic value of enlargement in transforming would-be members, including Turkey, so as to 
promote stability, prosperity and democracy to the wider Europe. The Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl 
Bildt, was instrumental in securing the support of eleven EU member states foreign ministers for a 
statement in December 2011 during the depths of the Eurozone crisis underlining the strategic and 
economic importance of Turkey’s accession process for Turkey and the EU, even if it eschewed the 
language of membership, instead welcoming ‘Turkey’s commitment to continuing reforms to meet 
its European goal and offer her our full support’ (EU Observer 2011).6  
 
The careful choice of language was deliberate and reflects the already noted cooling of enthusiasm 
for enlargement within the EU since 2005. In the case of Turkey, this cooling is particularly intense in 
some member states. Three member states stand out. First, there is Cyprus whose accession to the 
EU in 2004 without a political solution to the island’s division has proven to be catastrophic for 
Turkey’s membership bid. With Cyprus still divided and with Turkish troops on the island, 
enlargement has seen the EU not only import the conflict unresolved when the general expectation 
was that a resolution of sorts should have been achieved through Cyprus’ accession, but also admit a 
state willing to wield its veto over the development of EU-Turkey relations. Formally, the issue at 
stake is Turkey’s failure to fulfil its obligation to implement the Additional Protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement (2005) in respect of and to open its ports and airports to Cyprus. And on this matter 
Cyprus has successfully secured EU support; hence the 2006 Council decision that no negotiations on 
eight chapters would take place and no further chapters would be closed until Turkey fulfils its 
commitments under the Additional Protocol (Council of the European Union 2006, 8-9) (see Figure 
                                                          
5
 Cameron’s statement: ‘In terms of Turkey’s membership of the EU, I very much support that. That’s a long-
standing position of British foreign policy which I support, and we discussed that again in our talks today’ (UK 
Government 2014). 
6
 Emphasis added. The eleven foreign ministers came from: Lithuania, Sweden, Latvia, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and the United Kingdom. 
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1). The effect of the decision was to make the closure of accession negotiations conditional on a 
resolution of the Cyprus issue. Not satisfied with the leverage this gave it, the Cypriot government 
announced in December 2009 that it was blocking the opening of six other chapters (see Figure 3). 
The move was not welcomed by other member states, many of which have increasingly come to 
view the Cypriot government as intransigent on matters relating to Turkish accession and as 
unnecessarily obstructive in response to efforts to progress negotiations. It was, unsurprisingly, 
Cyprus that objected to the naming of the chapters to be opened following the EU-Turkey Summit in 
November 2015 and subsequently limited progress on actually opening chapters. The fears of those 
who warned against admitting Cyprus as a divided island have been realised.  
 
For many observers of EU-Turkey relations, Cyprus is the EU’s bête noire. At times over the last 
decade though there has been some intense competition for this dubious honour. A key challenger 
has been Nicolas Sarkozy, the former French President, whose opposition to Turkish accession was – 
and continues to be – voiced loudly and without the customary diplomacy that is normally 
associated with public utterances of EU leaders. Sarkozy’s position is straightforward: ‘Turkey's not 
in Europe. Turkey is Asia Minor… Turkey is a very great civilization and culture, but it's not a 
European one… Why should we build Europe with countries that are not European? I'm in favor of 
an agreement with Turkey, of a common market with Turkey, but integrating Turkey into Europe, 
well, no’ (International Herald Tribune 2007). Sarkozy’s opposition to Turkish accession has been 
most obviously felt in the French government’s decision in 2007 to block the opening of five 
negotiation chapters considered most directly related with membership (see Figure 3).7 For Sarkozy, 
these five chapters were ‘taboo’ (Mahony 2007). Significantly, even with Sarkozy leaving office in 
2012, the French block has generally been maintained. There has, however, been a slight softening 
of the French position. Negotiations on Chapter 22 were opened as soon as François Hollande 
replaced Sarkozy as French President and assessments of French policy suggest a shift from 
opposition to ‘cautious’ support for Turkish accession (Pineau 2014). And in 2014 Hollande, during a 
visit to Turkey, was quick to stress the importance of Chapters 23 and 24 for Turkey and the future 
of negotiations. The implication of his statement was that Cyprus, not France, is the real block to 
progress.  
                                                          
7
 Another more subtle but nevertheless symbolically important example of Sarkozy-inspired French opposition 
to Turkish accession was the insistence in December 2007 that the wording of the draft General Affairs Council 
conclusions on Turkey’s accession negotiations be stripped of any references to ‘accession’ or ‘membership’ 
and instead the accession negotiations be referred to simply as ‘intergovernmental conferences’ (The 
Economist, 2007a).  
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In procedural terms, this may be the case. Yet, the wider mood among member states is equally 
important. And here, the history of the first decade of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations would not 
be complete without reference to the changed position of the German government. Whereas 
between 1998 and 2005, coalition governments comprising Social Democrats and Greens 
championed Turkish accession, their Christian Democrat-led successors under the chancellorship of 
Angela Merkel have been far more sceptical. Both Merkel and her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
are known to oppose Turkey’s EU membership, Merkel being a strong supporter of a privileged 
partnership. As a consequence, since her initial electoral success in 2005, Germany has switched 
from being an advocate of Turkish accession to a prominent sceptic.8 Moreover, successive Merkel-
led governments have become far more lukewarm about enlargement generally, seeing the priority 
in deepening integration and managing the eurozone crisis. Coalition government has, however, 
tempered the outright opposition found in CDU election manifestos and those of its more 
Turkosceptic sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Until such time as Germany has 
a government that does not include the CDU/CSU, Turkey is unlikely to be making significant 
progress towards membership. Indeed, the fact that in late 2015 in the midst of the Syrian refugee 
crisis Germany led support for engaging with Turkey and for ‘re-energizing’ the accession process 
should not be heralded as significant change of Merkel’s position on Turkey eventually joining the 
EU. Attempting to manage the refugee crisis necessitated engagement with Turkey; and Realpolitik 
required Turkey to be granted some progress in the accession negotiations – as well as funding – to 
secure its assistance.  
 
And even if the current Germany position on Turkey did radically change, other states continue to 
keep a foot on the brake. Austria, which successfully delayed the opening of negotiations in 2005 
until it, beyond a deal on Croatian accession negotiations, had also secured an explicit reference to 
the ‘open-ended’ nature of negotiations and the EU’s capacity to absorb new members in the text of 
the framework for negotiations, is an obvious example.9 It remains opposed to Turkish accession, 
instead preferring some form a special partnership (Euractiv 2011). Successive governments have 
                                                          
8
 In December 2006, German opposition to Turkey was particularly pronounced. In Council discussions on 
suspending negotiations on eight chapters it was reported that the German position was to freeze 21 of the 35 
chapters (The Economist, 2006). If the alleged German position had prevailed, the accession negotiations 
would most likely have broken down just one year after they had begun.  
9
 Austria did not, however, manage to secure in the framework for negotiations the desired reference to a 
‘privileged partnership’ as an alternative to accession.  
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also committed to holding a referendum on Turkish accession to the EU. So too has the Netherlands, 
where scepticism about Turkey joining the EU is widespread. And then we can turn back to France, 
where since 2005 it has been a constitutional requirement, since modified, that future accession 
treaties be put to a referendum. Consequently, unlike in previous enlargement rounds, public 
opinion, at least in certain member states, has become an important and potentially decisive factor 
in determining the Turkey’s progress towards EU membership.  
 
Public opinion in the EU and the rise of ‘Turkoscepticism’ 
 
The outright opposition to Turkish accession expressed by Sarkozy and others often reflects 
personally held views. Yet there has always been clear evidence of popular scepticism towards 
admitting Turkey, at least in a number of member states. The last decade has seen this opposition 
not only increase, but also manifest itself more prominently in party political rhetoric. What might 
be described as ‘Turkoscepticism’ has been on the rise, often coinciding with increases in anti-
Muslim sentiments across Europe.10 In member states with larger Muslim populations, the response 
has been for governments to adopt more sceptical if not hostile positions towards Turkish accession. 
The clearest examples are Austria, Germany and France where Eurobarometer polling in 2005 
indicated that support for Turkey’s accession was as low as 10% in Austria and 21% in the other two 
countries (European Commission 2005a, 8). A clear majority was also against Turkey’s EU 
membership in Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia. Two years later, Eurobarometer was reporting that 61% 
of EU25 respondents regarded cultural differences between Turkey and the EU as an important 
obstacle to accession (European Commission 2006, 226). The figures were particularly high in Austria 
(84%), Greece (79%) and Germany (74%). In France the figure was 65%. Only a third of respondents 
(33%) shared the view that Turkish accession would increase regional security, a key driver of EU 
engagement with the country. No matter how powerful the political and economic arguments 
supporting Turkey’s accession have been or are, winning the hearts and minds of European citizens 
has always been a major challenge.  
 
Moreover, over the last decade, there has been scant evidence of any reversal in public opinion. On 
the contrary, opposition has tended to harden with EU voters unwilling to see economic benefits in 
Turkish accession and continuing to express concerns over cultural differences in particular 
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 For more detailed analyses on public opinion and discourses on Turkey, see Canan-Sokullu (2011); Ruiz 
Jiménez and Torreblanca (2007).  
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(Gerhards and Hans 2011). Tracking public opinion has not been helped, however, by 
Eurobarometer, with one exception in 2010, no longer asking, since 2006-2008, questions on 
attitudes to Turkey joining the EU. Instead the emphasis has been on attitudes to enlargement 
generally where survey results indicate a clear increase in the proportion of voters opposed to 
further enlargement from 39% (EU25) in 2005 to 49% (EU28) in 2015; support declined by a similar 
margin (European Commission 2005b, QA32.4; European Commission 2015b, QA18.3). The 
probability that within these figures there is greater opposition to Turkish accession as opposed to 
the accession of countries from the Western Balkans is high and can at least be inferred from a 2010 
Eurobarometer poll and various national surveys. In 2010 opposition in Austria to Turkish accession 
stood at 91% (European Commission 2010, QA20.8). In 2013, it was lower (72%) but still very high 
(Kurier 2013). In Germany in 2014 the figure stood at 69% compared to 52% in 2005 (Die Zeit 2014) 
and 78% in 2010 (European Commission 2010, QA20.8). Even in the United Kingdom, support levels 
are low. A poll in 2013 indicated that only 21% of UK voters believed that that Turkey should be 
admitted to the EU; 52% were opposed (YouGov 2013, 1), figures comparable to the 2010 
Eurobarometer findings: 25% in favour of and 55% opposed to Turkish accession. 
 
Such evident Turkoscepticism coupled with limited popular support for further enlargement has 
provided the domestic context for member state government positions on Turkish accession. It has 
also featured in EP elections. In contrast to most other cases of potential enlargement, this has 
translated in the case of Turkey’s candidacy into hardened positions. Contributing as well is the fact 
that several governments have consciously politicised Turkey’s accession bid by having either floated 
the idea of or committed to the holding of an eventual referendum on the country’s accession. 
Public opinion has therefore become a key variable for many member state governments in defining 
their position on Turkey. With few engaging in any meaningful public diplomacy on the anticipated 
benefits of Turkish accession, public opinion remains increasingly Turkosceptic. It seems set to be a 
key factor in some member states in determining whether there will ever be support for Turkish 
accession. It should not be forgotten either, that the EP has to approve accession treaties. Its 
position could be decisive. 
 
Institutional (in)activism 
 
Our fourth variable is supranational activism and the roles played by the Commission and, to a lesser 
degree, the EP as advocates for enlargement. The potential for the Commission in the process is 
considerable and has been ably demonstrated (O’Brennan 2006). It manages and assists in the 
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negotiation process; it guides and monitors the would-be members’ progress in meeting the 
accession criteria and benchmark requirements; and with its regular reports, strategy papers and 
recommendations, it informs the member states and the EP. It therefore helps shape the 
preferences of the member states and the positions of MEPs. And often key to its impact are the 
political vision and priorities of its President and the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement. This 
was evident during eastern enlargement when the 1999-2004 Prodi Commission, with Günter 
Verheugen as the first Commissioner for Enlargement, was a vocal champion of the process and 
oversaw the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004. 
 
The performances of the Barroso I (2004-10) and Barroso II (2010-14) Commissions have not come 
close, however, to matching what was achieved by the Prodi Commission. The same is true of the 
performances of subsequent Commissioners for Enlargement, Olli Rehn (2004-10) and Štefan Füle 
(2010-14). The current Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, has already declared a ‘pause’ in 
enlargement for five years. And symbolic of this slow-down, was the change of the Commission 
portfolio: from ‘Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy’ to ‘European Neighbourhood 
Policy and Enlargement Negotiations’. Enlargement has been put on auto-pilot.  
 
This shift reflects the fact that the EU has been faced with more pressing issues concerning economic 
reform, the Eurozone crisis, unemployment and its own public standing as euroscepticism continues 
to rise. In the post-eastern enlargement context, the Commission and Rehn especially focused on 
the ‘renewed consensus’ on enlargement with a consolidation of existing commitments, stricter 
conditionality, a more effective communications strategy and the promotion of the EU’s integration 
capacity. Rehn emphasised the cautious management of enlargement process and the 
administrative and technical preparedness of the applicants. This was designed to convince 
European publics and governments: ‘I cannot be a salesman of Turkey – but I can plead for fair, 
serious and determined negotiations, aimed at leading Turkey to EU membership’ (Rehn 2005). For 
Rehn, the Commission’s role was that of referee and manager supporting Turkey in meeting the 
accession criteria.  
 
His successor, Füle, stuck to the ‘renewed consensus’ approach with particular attention being given 
to maintaining the credibility of the enlargement process. Füle also sought to shift the focus from 
the EU’s enlargement fatigue to reform fatigue in the would-be members (Füle 2013). Hence, the 
revised approach to negotiations involved tackling ‘fundamentals first’ and focusing on Chapters 23 
and 24. Mindful of the blockages in negotiations caused by the Cyprus issue and the French and 
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Cypriot vetoes, however, Füle aimed to inject ‘a spirit of optimism and pragmatism’ into Turkey’s 
negotiations and ‘re-vitalise and re-energise’ relations (European Commission 2012). Hence in 2012, 
the ‘Positive Agenda’ already noted was launched. The Commission’s activism in the last decade has 
not therefore been one involving the championing of Turkey’s EU membership but rather one simply 
trying to keep accession negotiations going. Juncker’s efforts in 2015-16 to progress negotiations in 
exchange for Turkish assistance on managing migration and refuges from the war in Syria are a 
further demonstration of this.  
 
Similarly, the EP has not been a vocal champion of Turkey. The majority of MEPs may comprise 
supporters of eventual accession with a smattering of Turkophiles, but there is a consistent view that 
membership can only take place if Turkey persists with reforms and meets the conditions of entry. A 
significant minority of MEPs are more Turkosceptic and opposed to accession. The European 
People’s Party, the EP’s largest group, for example, favours a ‘privileged partnership’ instead of 
membership; the populist, far-right and far-left groupings have generally been more forthright in 
their opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. This meant that debates on the Commission’s regular 
reports on Turkish accession have often been heated and MEPs have been quick to criticise Turkey’s 
record on the rule of law, freedom of press, democratic backsliding, the authoritarian tendencies of 
successive Erdoğan governments, social media bans, the freedoms and rights accorded religious and 
ethnic minorities, and the Turkish government’s positions on the Cyprus issue and the Armenian 
‘genocide’. The Turkish government’s handling of the Gezi Park protests in 2013 attracted 
particularly fierce criticism. Several MEPs called for the suspension of accession negotiations arguing 
that Turkey no longer met the democratic standards of the EU (European Parliament 2014). The EP 
therefore cannot be regarded as an active champion of Turkey; there is support, but it is highly 
conditional, and it cannot mask the opposition.  
 
The absence of an enlargement narrative 
 
The absence of consensus in the EP on whether Turkey should ultimately be admitted to the EU has 
also been reflected in the wider lack of consensus over the last decade on whether and why further 
enlargement should take place. Essentially the EU has lacked a coherent narrative around the 
desirability or otherwise of enlargement, and especially to Turkey. Whereas in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s enlargement appeared an essential component of the EU’s raison d’être, the last decade 
has seen the EU undergo a period of almost existential crisis: the futures of the euro and of 
economic and monetary union have been questioned; a Greek exit from the eurozone has been a 
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distinct possibility, as has the prospect of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. Doom-laden accounts 
have predicted disintegration and the end of the EU. Adding to the sense of crisis has been the 
seemingly inexorable rise of Eurosceptic and anti-EU parties. Amidst all this, searching questions 
have been posed about the EU’s effectiveness as a transformative power beyond its borders, 
particularly in the wider Europe. With enlargement fatigue having set in, enlargement as part of the 
EU’s raison d’être has all but disappeared. Moreover with eastern enlargement complete, the once 
dominant narratives of ‘uniting Europe’ and of overcoming historical divisions no longer resonate. 
One could be forgiven for asking: ‘What is the EU’s enlargement narrative?’ 
 
Such concerns can be easily detected in the EU’s handling of Turkey’s candidacy. The accession 
negotiations have clearly lacked the force of a narrative that can change the perceptions and 
preferences of Turkey’s opponents. More generally, the EU’s tendency to differentiate between 
candidates has prevented the construction of a broad narrative for enlargement. Candidates are 
now individual cases; Turkey remains a special and separate case. Indeed, Turkey is of considerable 
geostrategic importance to the EU and a much needed partner in the areas of foreign and security 
policy, counter-terrorism, energy security and migration policy. The statement issued following the 
EU-Turkey Summit in November 2015 made this clear (Council of the European Union 2015b). 
However, a consistently and vocally expressed coherent and shared security-focused narrative for 
enlargement has simply not been developed, let alone forcibly articulated. Instead, in part because 
of its own democratic backsliding, Turkey has come to be viewed as much as a potential source of or 
conduit for security threats as it is part of the solution to the security challenges the EU is facing. 
Similarly, faced with crisis, the EU has continued to struggle with its own identity. The commitment 
to a cosmopolitan identity based on norms and values in which Turkey with its predominantly 
Muslim population would readily fit and be the ultimate example of inclusivity is no longer a 
prominent assumption in the political discourse in the EU. Turkey’s accession prospects have also 
been affected by the EU’s weakening ambitions in terms of being a global security actor. Internal 
crises and divisions have prevented progress on an issue in which Turkey was long regarded as 
playing an important role. Developments over the last decade beg the question, therefore: ‘Is there 
any narrative, shared or otherwise, for admitting Turkey?’  
 
Conclusion 
 
More than a decade after accession negotiations were launched, Turkey appears barely any closer to 
realising its goal of EU membership. Despite some movement in late 2015, negotiations have stalled; 
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the conditions for accession – already challenging – have become more difficult; the EU doubts its 
capacity to integrate Turkey; key member states are openly opposed to the country joining and are 
content to wield vetoes; public opinion is sceptical about enlargement and in many instances clearly 
opposed to Turkish accession; the Commission is more concerned with technical process than 
pushing the strategic goal; and the EP is divided. Unsurprisingly the EU lacks a coherent and 
prominent narrative selling enlargement to include Turkey that can also act as a driver for the 
process. The outlook for Turkey’s membership bid is far from rosy, and this is before consideration is 
given to the commitment of the Turkish government to the process and its capacity to implement 
the necessary reforms. 
 
The last decade has been a tough and disappointing period in EU-Turkey relations. It began with a 
degree of optimism; accession negotiations had at last been opened. They may have been ‘open-
ended’, but this could not detract from the fact that all previous applicants who had commenced 
negotiations had ultimately agreed with the EU the terms of their accession. That the negotiations 
have not been concluded does not mean that there is no hope. The negotiations have not been 
abandoned. Indeed, 2016 could see more negotiating chapters opened as part of the ‘re-energized’ 
accession process heralded by the EU-Turkey summit in November 2015. The door to membership is 
therefore open, or at least half open. Some voices in the EU want to keep the door open; others 
would prefer to see it shut. The resulting tensions keep the door half open. It may, however, equally 
be stuck. No one would gain from closure, yet not everybody wants Turkey to join. Better therefore 
to maintain the status quo. Preferences and attitudes may change; the EU may again see 
reputational and strategic value in admitting Turkey. A second decade of negotiations may tell. 
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Figures 
 
25 Science and research 12.06.2006 
20 Enterprise and industrial policy 29.03.2007 
18 Statistics 25.06.2007 
32 Financial control 26.07.2007 
21 Trans-European networks 19.12.2007 
28 Consumer and health protection 19.12.2007 
6 Company law 17.06.2008 
7 Intellectual property law 17.06.2008 
4 Free movement of capital 19.12.2008 
10 Information society and media 19.12.2008 
16 Taxation 30.06.2009 
27 Environment  21.12.2009 
12 Food safety, veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy 
30.06.2010 
22 Regional policy and coordination 
of structural instruments 
05.11.2013 
17 Economic and monetary policy 14.12.2015 
Figure 1: EU-Turkey Accession Negotiations: 
Opened Chapters 
 
1 Free movement of goods 
3 Right of establishment and freedom to 
provide service 
9 Financial services 
11 Agriculture and rural development 
13 Fisheries 
14 Transport policy 
29 Customs union 
30 External relations 
Figure 2: Negotiating Chapters whose 
Opening is conditional on Turkey 
implementing Additional Protocol 
 
2 Freedom of movement of workers Cyprus 
11 Agriculture and rural development France 
15 Energy Cyprus 
17 Economic and monetary policy* France 
22 Regional policy and coordination of 
structural instruments* 
France 
23 Judiciary and fundamental rights Cyprus 
24 Justice, freedom and security Cyprus 
25 Education and culture Cyprus 
31 Foreign, security and defence policy Cyprus 
33 Financial and budgetary provisions* France 
34 Institutions France 
* block since lifted 
Figure 3: Negotiating Chapters whose opening 
France (2007) and Cyprus (2009) announced they 
were blocking 
 
 
